Author: Anthony Mitchell

  • How to Read a DMARC Aggregate Report (Without Losing Your Mind)

    How to Read a DMARC Aggregate Report (Without Losing Your Mind)

    You’ve set up DMARC with a rua= address, and now your inbox is filling with emails from Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and others, each with a zipped file attached. Inside is a wall of XML. This guide explains what those reports are, how to read one, and, most importantly, what to do with what you find.

    What a DMARC aggregate report is

    When you publish a DMARC record with a rua=mailto: address, mailbox providers send you a summary of all the email they received claiming to be from your domain. Each report usually covers one day from one provider and tells you:

    • which servers (IP addresses) sent email as your domain
    • how many messages each one sent
    • whether those messages passed SPF and DKIM, and whether they aligned with your domain
    • what the provider did with them under your policy

    Reports contain no message content and no recipient addresses, just counts and authentication results. They usually arrive as .xml.gz or .zip attachments with names like google.com!yourdomain.co.uk!1759276800!1759363199.xml.gz: the reporter, your domain, then the start and end of the reporting period as Unix timestamps.

    The anatomy of a report

    Here’s a trimmed-down example of what you’ll see once you unzip one:

    <feedback>
      <report_metadata>
        <org_name>google.com</org_name>
        <report_id>1234567890</report_id>
        <date_range><begin>1759276800</begin><end>1759363199</end></date_range>
      </report_metadata>
      <policy_published>
        <domain>yourdomain.co.uk</domain>
        <adkim>r</adkim><aspf>r</aspf>
        <p>none</p>
      </policy_published>
      <record>
        <row>
          <source_ip>203.0.113.25</source_ip>
          <count>412</count>
          <policy_evaluated>
            <disposition>none</disposition>
            <dkim>pass</dkim>
            <spf>fail</spf>
          </policy_evaluated>
        </row>
        <identifiers><header_from>yourdomain.co.uk</header_from></identifiers>
        <auth_results>
          <dkim><domain>yourdomain.co.uk</domain><selector>s1</selector><result>pass</result></dkim>
          <spf><domain>bounces.platform-example.com</domain><result>pass</result></spf>
        </auth_results>
      </record>
    </feedback>

    It looks intimidating, but there are only four parts that matter.

    1. report_metadata: who sent the report

    The provider’s name (org_name), a report ID and the time period covered. Useful for knowing which mailbox provider’s view you’re looking at, and nothing more.

    2. policy_published: what your DMARC record said

    This shows the policy the provider found in your DNS: your domain, your policy (p) and the alignment modes (adkim and aspf, where r means relaxed and s strict). If this doesn’t match what you think you published, check your DNS.

    3. row: the headline result for each sender

    Each record represents one sending IP (and one combination of results). The row gives you:

    • source_ip: the server that sent the email
    • count: how many messages it sent in the period
    • policy_evaluated: the DMARC verdict for DKIM and SPF, which means “passed and aligned with your From domain”, plus the disposition (what the provider did: none, quarantine or reject)

    4. auth_results: the raw SPF and DKIM results

    This is the part people misread. auth_results shows whether SPF and DKIM passed for whichever domain they checked. It doesn’t care whether that domain matches yours. That’s why you can see SPF “pass” here but “fail” in policy_evaluated.

    In the example above, SPF passed, but for bounces.platform-example.com, the platform’s own bounce domain. It doesn’t align with yourdomain.co.uk, so DMARC counts SPF as a fail. DKIM, though, was signed by yourdomain.co.uk and passed, so the email passes DMARC overall. That’s a perfectly healthy result.

    The four patterns you’ll see most often

    Both pass: all good

    DKIM and SPF both pass in policy_evaluated. These are typically your main mailbox provider (Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace) and properly configured platforms. Nothing to do.

    DKIM passes, SPF fails: usually fine

    Common for marketing platforms that use their own bounce domain, and for forwarded email (forwarding breaks SPF but not DKIM). DMARC still passes, as in the example above.

    A sender you recognise fails both: fix this before enforcing

    Your CRM, helpdesk, invoicing tool or website form is sending as your domain but isn’t authenticated. Set up DKIM for your domain in that platform, and add it to SPF if it uses your bounce domain. These are exactly the senders that would be blocked if you moved to p=quarantine or p=reject too early.

    An IP you don’t recognise fails both: likely spoofing

    Look up the IP’s owner (any IP “whois” tool will tell you the network). If it’s not a service you use, someone is sending email pretending to be you. That’s the threat DMARC enforcement stops, and a good reason not to sit on p=none for ever.

    A note on the 2026 DMARC update

    In May 2026 the IETF published updated DMARC standards (RFC 9989, 9990 and 9991), replacing the original 2015 specification. The aggregate report format changes slightly. For example, the DKIM selector becomes required and the pct field is dropped. Most providers still send the older format for now, so you may see both. What the reports tell you, and how you act on them, stays the same.

    Why reading XML by hand doesn’t scale

    One report is manageable. But a busy domain receives reports from dozens of providers every day, each listing many IP addresses, and the picture only becomes clear when you combine them over weeks. That’s why most businesses use a DMARC reporting tool that collects the files, groups IPs by sending service and flags new failures automatically.

    Turn your DMARC reports into action

    Our DMARC monitoring service collects your reports, identifies every service sending as your domain, flags spoofing and new failures, and guides you safely to p=reject. Not sure where you stand? Send a test email to The Inbox Wizard Test and see whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass.

    5.0 from 12 Google reviews

  • SPF PermError “Too Many DNS Lookups”: What It Means and How to Fix It

    SPF PermError “Too Many DNS Lookups”: What It Means and How to Fix It

    If an SPF checker or a bounce message has told you SPF PermError: too many DNS lookups, your SPF record has quietly stopped working. Mailbox providers aren’t partly checking it. As far as they’re concerned, it’s broken, and that can drag down DMARC and your inbox placement with it.

    The good news is that it’s one of the most fixable problems in email authentication. Here’s what’s going on and how to sort it.

    What “too many DNS lookups” means

    Your SPF record lists the services allowed to send email as your domain. To check it, the receiving server has to look up each entry in DNS. To stop SPF checks being abused or slowing mail down, the SPF standard (RFC 7208) caps these lookups at 10 per check.

    Go over 10 and the result is a PermError (“permanent error”). The receiver stops evaluating and treats your SPF as failed. That means:

    • SPF can’t help your emails pass DMARC, so you’re relying entirely on DKIM.
    • Any sender that isn’t signing with DKIM for your domain will fail DMARC. Under Microsoft’s rules for Outlook and Hotmail, that can mean 550 5.7.515 rejections.
    • Once you move DMARC to quarantine or reject, those emails go to spam or bounce.

    What counts towards the limit

    Not everything in an SPF record costs a lookup:

    • Each counts as one lookup: include:, a, mx, ptr, exists: and the redirect= modifier.
    • Free (no lookup): ip4:, ip6: and all.

    The catch is nested lookups. When you add include: for a provider, you also take on every lookup inside their SPF record. One include can cost you three or four lookups on its own.

    There’s also a lesser-known second limit: no more than two “void” lookups. These are lookups that return nothing, typically an include: pointing at a service that has since shut down or changed its address. Go over two and you get a PermError too.

    How UK businesses end up over the limit

    It rarely happens all at once. A typical record grows over a few years: Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, then a newsletter platform, then a CRM, a helpdesk, accounting software that emails invoices, a booking system, the website’s contact form, and a platform someone trialled in 2022 and never removed. Each one asked you to “add our include to your SPF record”, and nobody added up the total.

    v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.google.com include:mail.crm-example.com include:sendgrid.net include:helpdesk-example.com a mx ~all

    A record like this can easily need 12 to 15 lookups once the nested includes are counted.

    How to fix it

    1. Count your lookups

    Run your domain through an SPF lookup counter that expands every nested include, so you can see which entries cost the most. Write the list down: you’ll need it for the next steps.

    2. Remove anything you no longer use

    This is the quickest win. Ask “do we still use this?” of every include. Old marketing platforms, a previous email host after a migration, and abandoned trials are all common.

    3. Check whether each platform actually needs to be in your SPF

    SPF checks the Return-Path (bounce) domain, not the From address people see. Many marketing and transactional platforms use their own bounce domain unless you set up a custom one. In that case your include: does nothing for SPF at all. Those emails pass DMARC through DKIM signed with your domain instead. Check each platform’s domain authentication settings before removing anything, but this often frees up several lookups.

    4. Swap a and mx for fixed IP addresses

    If your web server or mail server has a fixed IP address, list it with ip4: (free) instead of a or mx (one lookup each). Only do this for IPs you control and that won’t change without you knowing.

    5. Remove ptr

    The SPF standard says ptr should not be used. It’s slow, unreliable and costs a lookup. If it’s in your record, it can almost always go.

    6. Move some senders to a subdomain

    Send marketing from news.yourdomain.co.uk or invoices from billing.yourdomain.co.uk, each with its own SPF record. Every subdomain gets its own 10-lookup allowance, and it keeps the reputation of your marketing mail separate from your day-to-day business email.

    7. Be careful with “SPF flattening”

    Flattening replaces includes with the IP addresses behind them, which brings the count right down. The risk is that providers change their IPs without telling you, and a flattened record silently goes out of date. If you flatten, use a service that keeps the record updated automatically rather than doing it by hand once.

    After you’ve made the change

    • Make sure you still have exactly one SPF record. Two v=spf1 records is a separate PermError.
    • Re-count the lookups: you want 10 or fewer, ideally with a couple spare for the next tool you adopt.
    • Send test emails from each platform and check the headers show spf=pass or an aligned dkim=pass.
    • Watch your DMARC reports for a week or two to catch any sender you missed.

    Test your SPF now

    Not sure whether your SPF is working? Send a test email to The Inbox Wizard Test and it shows whether SPF passes. If you’d rather hand it over, we’ll untangle your SPF record, set up DKIM for every platform you send from and make sure nothing breaks along the way.

    5.0 from 12 Google reviews

  • DMARC p=none: What It Means and How to Move to Enforcement Safely

    DMARC p=none: What It Means and How to Move to Enforcement Safely

    If your DMARC record looks like this, your domain is in “monitoring mode”:

    v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]

    That’s a perfectly good place to start. It’s also where a huge number of businesses stop, often for years, without realising what it leaves open.

    What is DMARC?

    DMARC stands for Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance. It sits on top of SPF and DKIM and does two jobs.

    First, it tells mailbox providers what to do with email that claims to be from your domain but fails authentication: let it through, send it to spam, or reject it. That’s your policy, the p= part of the record.

    Second, it asks providers to send you reports. Aggregate reports (rua=) arrive daily and show every server sending email as your domain, and whether it passed. Forensic reports (ruf=) give details on individual failures, though most big providers no longer send them. The aggregate reports are the useful ones, and our guide to reading a DMARC aggregate report explains how to make sense of them.

    Without DMARC, anyone can send email pretending to be you, and you’d never know. With it, you can see who’s using your domain and, once you’re ready, stop the ones who shouldn’t be.

    What p=none actually does

    DMARC has three policies. Each tells receiving mailbox providers what to do with email that claims to be from your domain but fails authentication:

    PolicyWhat happens to failing emailProtects against spoofing?
    p=noneDelivered as normal; you just get reportsNo
    p=quarantineSent to spam/junkMostly
    p=rejectRefused outrightYes

    So with p=none, someone can send a fake invoice “from” your domain to your customers and it will still be delivered. What you get in return is visibility: the reports sent to your rua address show every server sending as your domain and whether it passes SPF and DKIM.

    Is p=none enough?

    For delivery, mostly yes. Google, Yahoo and Microsoft all require bulk senders to have a DMARC record, and p=none meets that minimum. If you were seeing errors like Microsoft’s 550 5.7.515, a p=none record (plus passing, aligned SPF or DKIM) is what clears them.

    For protection, no. Your domain can still be used in phishing and invoice fraud, which damages your reputation with customers and with mailbox providers.

    For BIMI, no. If you want your logo to appear next to your emails in Gmail and other inboxes, BIMI requires an enforcement policy: p=quarantine or p=reject.

    Why businesses get stuck on p=none

    The fear is reasonable: “If I switch to reject and I’ve missed something, my own emails will stop arriving.” That’s exactly what happens when a business moves too fast. A payroll system, a website contact form, a CRM or an old marketing platform is still sending as the domain without being authenticated, and those emails disappear.

    The way out is not to stay on p=none for ever. It’s to use the reports to find every sender first.

    A safe path from p=none to p=reject

    1. Make sure reports are arriving, and actually read them

    DMARC aggregate reports arrive as zipped XML files, usually daily from each provider. They’re not meant to be read by humans in their raw form. Use a DMARC reporting service (or ours) to turn them into a readable list of sending sources.

    2. List every legitimate sender

    Go through each source in the reports and label it: Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, your email marketing platform, CRM, helpdesk, accounting software, website, and so on. Anything you don’t recognise is either a forgotten tool or someone spoofing you.

    3. Fix authentication and alignment for each one

    For every legitimate sender, set up DKIM signed with your domain, and add it to SPF where the platform supports it. DMARC passes when SPF or DKIM passes and matches the domain in your From address. DKIM is the more reliable of the two, because it survives forwarding.

    4. Move to p=quarantine

    Once your reports show your legitimate mail passing consistently (we suggest at least two to four weeks of clean data), update the record:

    v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:[email protected]

    Keep watching the reports. If a legitimate source starts failing, it goes to spam rather than vanishing, so you can catch it and fix it.

    5. Move to p=reject

    After another few weeks with no surprises, go to full protection:

    v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]

    6. Don’t forget subdomains and parked domains

    Your subdomains inherit your policy unless you set sp=. Domains you own but never send from (old brand names, .ie or .com variants of your .co.uk) should be locked down with v=spf1 -all and p=reject straight away, because they’re easy targets for spoofing.

    How long should the whole process take?

    For most small and medium-sized businesses, six to twelve weeks from p=none to p=reject is realistic. The time goes mainly on tracking down the senders nobody remembered.

    Where does your domain stand?

    Send a test email to The Inbox Wizard Test to see whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass for your domain before you move to enforcement. Want it done for you? Our DMARC service handles the reports, finds every sender and takes your domain to p=reject safely.

    5.0 from 12 Google reviews

  • How to fix “550 5.7.515 Access denied” from Outlook and Hotmail

    How to fix “550 5.7.515 Access denied” from Outlook and Hotmail

    If you’ve started seeing bounces like this when emailing Outlook, Hotmail or Live addresses, you’re not alone:

    550 5.7.515 Access denied, sending domain [yourdomain.co.uk] doesn't meet the required authentication level.

    It means Microsoft has rejected your email outright. It hasn’t gone to junk; it hasn’t been delivered at all. The good news is that the fix is almost always a DNS change you can make in under an hour.

    Why Microsoft is rejecting your email

    Since 5 May 2025, Microsoft has enforced authentication rules for anyone sending more than 5,000 emails a day to its consumer mailboxes (outlook.com, hotmail.com and live.com, including hotmail.co.uk and live.co.uk). Microsoft originally said non-compliant mail would go to junk. Instead, it chose to reject it, and the 5.7.515 error is the result.

    To get through, your sending domain needs all three of these:

    • SPF must pass: the server sending your email must be listed in your domain’s SPF record.
    • DKIM must pass: your email must carry a valid DKIM signature for your domain.
    • DMARC must exist: at least p=none, and it must align with SPF or DKIM (ideally both).

    The 5,000-a-day threshold is Microsoft’s target, but Microsoft’s own support forums are full of small businesses and individuals hitting this error too. Treat these rules as the minimum for anyone emailing Microsoft customers.

    Step 1: Check what’s actually missing

    Before you touch DNS, find out which of the three checks is failing. You can do this two ways:

    1. Take our free test. Send an email to The Inbox Wizard Test and it shows whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, in seconds.
    2. Read the headers of a sent email. Send a message to a Gmail or Outlook address you own, open the original message/headers, and look for the Authentication-Results line. You want spf=pass, dkim=pass and dmarc=pass.

    Step 2: Fix SPF

    Your domain should have one TXT record starting v=spf1, listing every service that sends email as you: your mailbox provider (Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace), your email marketing platform, your CRM, your helpdesk, your invoicing tool and so on.

    v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.your-email-platform.com ~all

    (Replace the second include: with the value your email platform gives you. Each provider publishes its own.)

    Common mistakes we see:

    • Two SPF records. If you have more than one v=spf1 record, SPF fails for everything. Merge them into one.
    • Too many lookups. SPF allows a maximum of 10 DNS lookups. Pile up enough include: entries and SPF breaks with a PermError.
    • A forgotten sender. A newer tool (a CRM or booking system, say) sending as your domain but not listed in SPF.

    Step 3: Fix DKIM

    DKIM is set up inside each sending platform, not just in DNS. In Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Mailchimp, Klaviyo, HubSpot and most others, there’s a “domain authentication” or “DKIM” setting that gives you records (usually CNAMEs) to add to your DNS. Add them, then go back and click verify or enable. That last click is the step most people miss.

    The important detail: DKIM must be signed with your domain. If your platform signs with its own domain (for example d=sendingplatform.com), DKIM technically passes but won’t align with DMARC.

    Step 4: Add a DMARC record

    If you have no DMARC record, add a TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.co.uk:

    v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]

    p=none is enough to satisfy Microsoft (and Google and Yahoo). The rua address receives daily reports showing every service sending as your domain and whether it passes, which is the information you need to move to a stronger policy later. (Our guide to why DMARC matters covers this in more depth.)

    Step 5: Retest and resend

    DNS changes can take anything from a few minutes to a few hours to take effect. Once they have, send another test email to an Outlook or Hotmail address and check the headers again. When SPF or DKIM passes and aligns with your From domain, and DMARC passes, the 5.7.515 bounces stop.

    Still bouncing?

    If everything passes and you’re still being rejected, the cause is usually one of these:

    • A third-party platform sending as your domain that you didn’t know about (DMARC reports reveal these).
    • Alignment: SPF passes for the platform’s bounce domain but not yours, and DKIM is signed with the platform’s domain.
    • Forwarding, which can break SPF. DKIM is what survives forwarding, so make sure it’s in place.

    Get it sorted today

    Every day these bounces continue, invoices, quotes and campaigns aren’t reaching a big share of your UK customers, as Outlook and Hotmail addresses are everywhere. Send a test email to The Inbox Wizard Test and it shows whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, in seconds. Prefer someone to just fix it? We set up and verify SPF, DKIM and DMARC for UK and Irish businesses, usually without any downtime to your email.

    5.0 from 12 Google reviews